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Developing a MethoDology for assessing safety prograMs 
targeting huMan error in aviation
“I believe that the past is prologue.....In our recommendations we try to take what we have 
learned and correct situations so it shouldn’t happen again.” 
—Former Natonal Transportaton Safety Board Charman James Hall (996)
INTRODUCTION
Indeed, the Natonal Transportaton Safety Board 
(NTSB), Federal Avaton Admnstraton (FAA), and 
other safety organzatons have commtted extraordnary 
resources to prevent cvlan avaton accdents. As a result, 
avaton n the U.S., partcularly commercal avaton, has 
become one of the safest modes of transportaton. Stll, 
accdents can happen, often repeatng the same sequence 
of events played out many tmes before. As a result, we 
are often left wth the regrettable truth that there are 
really very few “new” accdents, just dfferent players. 
Perhaps that s why Charman Hall chose the operatve 
term “shouldn’t” rather than “won’t” n 996.
So f there really are few “new” accdents, why has the 
avaton accdent rate remaned relatvely stable over the 
last several years? After all, f we already know what the 
problem s, why have we been unable to fix t? Perhaps 
t has somethng to do wth the current state of avaton 
safety. Truth be told, the ndustry s extremely safe, and 
the easy fixes have been dentfied and remeded. What 
remans to be addressed s the small fracton of accdents 
attrbutable to perhaps the most complex problem facng 
avaton today – human error.
A closer examnaton of the current avaton accdent 
record has revealed that anywhere between 70-80% of 
all avaton accdents are at least partally attrbutable to 
human error (Wegmann & Shappell, 2003). Therefore, 
t stands to reason that, f quantfiable mprovements 
n avaton safety are to be realzed, the prmary focus 
should be on the human operator (.e., arcrew) and those 
nvolved wth the safe conduct of flght (e.g., mechan-
cs, supervsors, ar traffic controllers) rather than more 
tradtonal areas lke the arcraft tself.
Wth ths n mnd, the FAA has employed the 
Human Factors Analyss and Classficaton System 
(HFACS; Wegmann & Shappell, 200, 2003; Shappell 
& Wegmann, 2003, 2004) to dentfy the human fac-
tors underlyng both commercal and general avaton. 
Prncpal among the FAA’s findngs usng HFACS was 
the observaton that, whle prevous safety programs may 
have mpacted other areas of avaton, there has been 
lttle evdence that they have had a sgnficant mpact on 
any specfic type of human error (Fgure ). That s to 
say, the percentage of accdents assocated wth arcrew 
error (.e., skll-based errors, decson errors, perceptual 
errors, and volatons) has remaned relatvely stable 
snce 990.
What ths mples s that nterventon strateges mple-
mented n the 990s have had, at best, ubqutous effects 
on the errors and volatons commtted by arcrew. More 
lkely, however, there has been no sustaned mpact of 
any partcular nterventon program (Shappell, Detwler, 
Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, & Wegmann, 2006). 
The latter should come as no surprse, gven that pror 
to these FAA studes, no comprehensve analyss of ar-
crew and supervsory error had been conducted usng a 
human factors approach to accdent causaton. Not to 
menton that there has been no systematc human factors 
examnaton of the current or proposed safety programs 
amed at addressng human error.
But n some ways, that s puttng the proverbal cart 
before the horse. After all, whle HFACS provded a 
theoretcally derved and valdated framework for ac-
cdent/ncdent nvestgaton and analyss, a smlar 
framework dd not exst that would allow the FAA and 
other organzatons to evaluate the potental benefits of 
current and proposed human error nterventon strateges. 
So the better queston may be whether a “human factors” 
analyss of safety programs s even possble.
NASA Intervention Strategies
At least one study (Wegmann & Rantanen, 2003) 
suggests that such an analyss can be performed usng a 
set of standards derved from the same body of lterature 
used to develop HFACS. In ther book, A Human Factors 
Approach to Aviation Accidents, Wegmann and Shappell 
(2003) descrbed an nterventon taxonomy clustered 
around four broad categores:
. Envronment (e.g., the control of temperature, 
nose, vbraton, lghtng)
2. Human (personnel selecton, ncentves, tranng, 
teamwork, communcaton, etc.)
3. Machne (engneerng desgn, capacty, etc.)
4. Task (orderng/tmng of events, procedures, stan-
dardzaton, etc.)
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Figure 2. Percentage of NASA safety programs  
within each intervention category. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of unsafe acts committed by 
aircrew during general aviation (Panel A) commut-
er (Panel B) and air carrier (Panel C) operations 
by year. Note that percentages will not add up to 
100% due to multiple causal factors associated 
with most accidents.
Usng ths framework, Wegmann and Rantanen 
(2003) examned a varety of technologes developed by 
NASA’s avaton safety program (AvSP). From energy 
absorbng seats, restrants, and structures to synthetc 
vson, each safety program was classfied wthn one 
of the four nterventon categores. As shown n Fgure 
2, they concluded that NASA’s prmary nterventon 
strateges targeted the machne rather than the human, 
envronment, or task. Two programs, Incdent Report-
ng Enhancement Tools and Fast-tme Smulaton of 
System-wde Rsks, were consdered unclassfiable by 
the raters usng these categores.
In a separate part of ther study, Wegmann & Ran-
tanen (2003) examned the NASA technologes usng 
the HFACS framework. Surprsngly, t was determned 
that nearly half of the technologes that NASA was 
developng were rated as havng no mpact on arcrew 
error. What’s more, those that mght have an mpact 
prmarly targeted decson errors, by provdng better 
nformaton, automaton, and tranng. An even smaller 
percentage of the technologes targeted arcrew error, n 
general, and only one of the products prmarly targeted 
skll-based errors – the most frequent human error fac-
ng both commercal and general avaton. None of the 
products prmarly targeted volatons, another area of 
concern wthn cvlan avaton operatons.
Purpose
Clearly, f mprovements n safety are to be real-
zed, a more systematc methodology s needed for 
generatng nterventon/preventon strateges that can 
te nto human error frameworks lke HFACS. Such a 
methodology would help ensure that factors affectng 
human performance are addressed at multple levels 
and from multple drectons, thereby facltatng the 
development of effectve nterventon strategies rather 
than a sngle, narrowly focused desgn fix. 
Ths report descrbes two studes that buld upon 
the methodology orgnally descrbed by Wegmann 
and Shappell (2003) and used by Wegmann and 
Rantanen (2003) wth NASA safety programs. The 
first study descrbes an ndependent valdaton of the 
four nterventon methodologes usng safety recom-
mendatons from the NTSB. The second descrbes the 
examnaton of proposed FAA avaton safety programs 
usng a prototype nterventon matrx that maps the 
unsafe acts of operators (.e., skll-based errors, decson 
errors, perceptual errors, and volatons) onto several 
nterventon approaches.
3STUDY 1: ANAlYSIS Of NTSB 
RECOmmENDATIONS
Investgatng accdents, dentfyng potental nterven-
tons, and ssung safety recommendatons are central to 
any safety program and as such are a major functon of 
local, state, and federal safety boards. Indeed, one such 
natonal entty, the NTSB, ctes safety recommendatons 
as “… the most mportant part of [ther] mandate…” 
(NTSB, 2002). 
Ideally, safety recommendatons, when adopted by 
cognzant organzatons, wll postvely nfluence future 
operatons n the field and thereby mprove overall sys-
tem safety. However, recommendatons are just that … 
recommendations and, as such, are not always adopted. 
Moreover, they are often based solely on solated events 
or at best a few events over a very short perod of tme 
rather than more global analyses of the system as a whole. 
Whle these nterventons may solve a local or sngle-pont 
problem, they often do not have far-reachng mpact.
Further complcatng matters, many domans such 
as avaton and ther correspondng safety boards have 
tradtonally strong relatons wth quanttatve dscplnes 
lke engneerng and physcs. Consequently, whle these 
organzatons may be especally adept at dealng wth 
mechancal ssues, they tend to be less robust when 
dealng wth organzatonal or human-centered aspects 
of accdents lke human error, organzatonal falure, 
communcaton, and rsk assessment (Stoop, 2002).
Recognzng ths, the NTSB, lke many safety enttes, 
has ntegrated human factors experts nto ther organza-
ton, presumably leadng to recommendatons that ad-
dress the entre system rather than a sngle engneerng or 
mechancal aspect, per se. However, employng human 
factors experts alone does not necessarly translate nto 
a breadth of nterventons. The queston remans, what 
specfic nterventon approaches does the NTSB employ? 
In other words, does the NTSB tend to be un-dmen-
sonal (lke NASA) or mult-dmensonal wth regard to 
specfic nterventon approaches?
mEThOD
NTSB Safety Recommendations
To examne ths queston, avaton safety recommen-
datons assocated wth commercal (4 CFR Part 2 
– ar carrer and Part 35 – commuter) avaton accdents 
occurrng between 998 and 2004 were obtaned from 
the NTSB’s offical Webste (www.ntsb.gov). Of the 
47 commercal avaton accdents reports that were 
completed at the tme of ths study, 622 unque safety 
recommendatons were dentfied. However, several of the 
recommendatons conssted of compound solutons. In 
those cases, the orgnal recommendaton was separated 
nto sub-recommendatons whle preservng the ntent of 
the NTSB. Ths resulted n a revsed lst of 872 unque 
recommendatons for further analyss.
Clustering Process
The recommendatons were ndependently clustered 
nto categores by two analysts (one wth a doctoral-level 
background n psychology, the other wth a graduate 
background n engneerng) based on ther smlartes. 
The analysts were not nstructed to use any predefined 
taxonomy or classficaton scheme. They were smply 
nstructed to ndependently assgn each recommendaton 
to categores of ther choosng, based upon the nature of 
the recommendaton. 
Not surprsng, gven the vagueness of the nstructons, 
there were some dfferences n the terms used by the two 
analysts, but there were also strong smlartes. Wherever 
dsagreements occurred, the analysts were asked to dscuss 
ther clusterng heurstc and to agree on a sngle clas-
sficaton scheme. In the end, all 872 recommendatons 
were classfied based on ther underlyng smlartes by 
two ndependent analysts, who later came to a consensus 
on the number and labels for each of these clusters.
Results
Ultmately, the analysts generated nne unque cat-
egores of recommendatons, whch ncluded the desgn 
of parts/dsplays, procedures, communcaton, tranng, 
requests to conduct focused studes, rules, manuals, 
nspecton, and human resources. These nne categores 
were then further clustered nto four larger categores 
based on ther smlartes: ) admnstratve/organza-
tonal; 2) mechancal/ engneerng; 3) human/crew; and 
4) task/msson. Each category and ther accompanyng 
subcategores are brefly descrbed n Table .
Distribution of recommendations
On average, roughly sx recommendatons spread 
across just under three (2.8) nterventon subcategores 
were observed per accdent. The actual dstrbuton of 
recommendatons across the nterventon categores and 
subcategores s presented n Table 2.
From a global perspectve, t appears that roughly 
two-thrds of the recommendatons were ether admn-
stratve/organzatonal or mechancal/ engneerng fixes. 
However, nearly a quarter of the recommendatons were 
amed at ether the task or msson. 
Surprsngly few nterventons drectly targeted opera-
tors (arcrew), even though prevous studes repeatedly 
show that more major accdents have been attrbuted to 
human error than to any other sngle cause (Wegmann 
& Shappell, 2003; Boquet et al., n revew; Detwler et al., 
4Table 1. Proposed categories and sub-
categories of NTSB recommendations.
Administrative/Organizational 
Rules/Regulations/Policies: Issuing, modifying, 
establishing, amending, and/or reviewing 
policies, rules, or regulations. 
Information Management/ Communication:
Improvements in disseminating, storing, 
archiving and publishing information. Also 
included are recommendations regarding 
collecting data; issuing information bulletins, 
advisory circulars, and reporting activity.  
Research/ Special Study: Conducting research to 
determine the impact of recent technological 
advances or call for special studies to review 
processes, develop/validate methodologies, 
evaluate the feasibility of safety equipment, 
and/or conduct surveys.  
Human Resource Management: Adequacy of 
staff in specific situations, the need for additional 
personnel, and the evaluation of individual skills 
of employees. 
Mechanical/Engineering 
Design/Repair: Specific manufacturing changes 
including the design of parts. Also included is 
the modification, replacement, removal and/or 
installation, or repair of parts and equipment. 
Inspection: Maintenance inspections, 
overhauling, detecting damage, including day-to-
day operations such as inspecting fuel, oil level, 
and recommended safety checks. 
Human / Crew 
Training: Reviewing, developing, and 
implementing training programs. Also included 
is the training of personnel in handling 
emergencies. 
Task/Mission 
Procedures: Amending, reviewing, modifying, 
revising, establishing, developing, and validating 
procedures.  
Manuals: Reviewing, revising, issuing, 
amending, and modifying manuals, bulletins, 
checklists, and other instructions or guidance. 
Table 2. Percentage of recommendations 
associated with each intervention category. 
Intervention Category % n 
Administrative/Organizational 34.18  
 Rules/Regulations/Policies  9.29  81 
 Information management/ Comm. 13.76 120 
 Research/Special study 10.44  91 
 Human resource management  0.69  6 
Mechanical/Engineering 31.20  
 Design/Repair 23.17 202 
 Inspection  8.03  70 
Human/Crew 11.47  
Training 11.47 100 
Task/Mission 23.16  
 Procedures 14.56 127 
 Manuals  8.60  75 
(23.7%) - nearly twce as many as any other category. 
Consderably fewer were amed at procedures, tranng, 
nformaton management/ communcaton, and the 
other subcategores. 
SUmmARY
To date, there have been few attempts to systemat-
cally study recommendatons generated by nvestgatve 
organzatons lke the NTSB. Ths s unfortunate, because 
the results of such studes may help n understandng 
why accdent rates have stablzed over the last several 
decades and could lead to the development of more ef-
fectve nterventon strateges. For example, n ths study 
alone there were four broad categores of nterventons 
dentfied, comprsng nne unque categores of recom-
mendatons. 
When examnng the breadth and scope of NTSB rec-
ommendatons, even at ths level, t appears that current 
safety recommendatons n avaton tend to focus more 
on mprovng the desgn of systems or some manner of 
organzatonal change rather than focusng on operatonal 
personnel. Whle these recommendatons are obvously 
well-ntentoned and often specfic to a partcular accdent, 
they may be msplaced or too narrow n scope. Ths may 
help explan why the percentage of accdents assocated 
wth human error has not changed over the last 5 years 
(Wegmann & Shappell, 2003; Wegmann et al., 2005; 
Shappell et al., n press).
Ths s not to say that the desgn of new technology 
wll not have a sgnficant mpact on how people perform. 
After all, advances n avaton technology and engneerng 
have accounted for marked reductons n the avaton 
accdent rate snce the late 950s. On the other hand, 
some of these advances have led to new, occasonally 
2006; Shappell et al., n press). It has also been observed 
that wder systemc ssues, ncludng the manageral 
and regulatory context of avaton operatons, were also 
mentoned n a large number of reports (Holloway & 
Johnson, 2004; Johnson, n revew), even though ths 
does not seem to be reflected n the accdent record.
A closer examnaton revealed that, smlar to Weg-
mann and Rantanen’s study of NASA safety programs, 
desgn fixes consttuted the largest percentage of any 
ndvdual type of recommendaton made by the NTSB 
5catastrophc, errors (e.g., autoplot-mode errors, Sarter 
& Woods, 992; 994). What appears to be requred s 
a broader, systematc approach to accdent nterventon, 
partcularly f we are to effectvely address human error 
wthn avaton operatons. But how can ths be done?
To ensure that safety professonals generate effectve 
nterventon strateges, rather than a sngle “knee jerk” 
fix to a problem, knowledge of all vable nterventons s 
requred. Towards these ends, the present study suggests 
that there are at least four broad categores of nterven-
tons that appear tenable wthn the avaton ndustry. 
These are Admnstratve/Organzatonal, Human/Crew, 
Mechancal/Engneerng, and Task/Procedure. 
These four approaches dffered slghtly from those 
prevously proposed by Wegmann and Shappell (2003) 
and utlzed by Wegmann and Rantanen (2003) to ana-
lyze NASA safety programs. One category that naturally 
surfaced from the present analyss, but was mssng from 
the Wegmann and Rantanen study, was Admnstra-
tve/Organzatonal nterventons. In contrast, “env-
ronmental” nterventons dd not appear n the current 
study but were present n the NASA study (Wegmann 
& Rantanen, 2003).
In the end, the queston s not whether or not there 
are three, four, five, or more approaches to dentfyng 
potental accdent nterventons as much as there s de-
fintvely more than one. Exactly what those approaches 
are remans to be fully explored. However, the five ap-
proaches dentfied between the present study and the 
nvestgaton conducted by Wegmann and Rantanen 
(2003) s a reasonable first start.
STUDY 2: hfIX ANAlYSIS Of JSAT/
JSIT RECOmmENDATIONS
Identfyng vable approaches for ntervenng, however, 
s only the first step. The ablty to map nterventons onto 
specfic types of human error s also vtally mportant. 
In other words, smply generatng a varety of nterven-
tons across several domans, whether they are human, 
mechancal, envronmental, and so on, s lkely to be 
neffectve unless such nterventons drectly target the 
problem area.
Gven that human error contnues to be the largest 
contrbutor to commercal and general avaton accdents, 
t makes sense to map dfferent nterventons aganst 
specfic error forms. What s needed s a theoretcal frame-
work that captures the underlyng causal mechansms 
of human error along wth the nterventon approaches 
dentfied n Study .
human factors Analysis and Classification System
Such an error framework already exsts and s wdely 
used wthn the avaton ndustry. Ths framework, 
the Human Factors Analyss and Classficaton System 
(HFACS), descrbes two general categores of unsafe 
acts that operators commt: errors – the honest mstakes 
ndvduals make every day, and violations – the wllful 
dsregard for the rules and regulatons of safety. Wthn 
those two overarchng categores, HFACS descrbes three 
types of errors (decson, skll-based, and perceptual) and 
two types of volatons (routne and exceptonal). Each 
s brefly descrbed below.
Errors
One of the more common error forms, decision er-
rors, represents conscous, goal-ntended behavor that 
proceeds as desgned, yet the plan proves nadequate or 
napproprate for the stuaton. Often referred to as “honest 
mstakes,” these unsafe acts typcally manfest as poorly 
executed procedures, mproper choces, or smply the 
msnterpretaton or msuse of relevant nformaton.
In contrast to decson errors, the second error form, 
skill-based errors, occurs wth lttle or no conscous thought. 
Just as lttle thought goes nto turnng one’s steerng wheel 
or shftng gears n an automoble, basc flght sklls such 
as stck and rudder movements and vsual scannng often 
occur wthout thnkng. The dfficulty wth these hghly 
practced and seemngly automatc behavors s that they 
are partcularly susceptble to attenton and/or memory 
falures. As a result, skll-based errors such as the break-
down n vsual scan patterns, nadvertent actvaton/de-
actvaton of swtches, forgotten ntentons, and omtted 
tems n checklsts often appear. Even the manner n (or 
skll) whch one fles an arcraft (aggressve, tentatve, or 
controlled) can affect safety.
Whle decson and skll-based errors have dom-
nated most accdent databases and have, therefore, been 
ncluded n most error frameworks, the thrd and final 
error form, perceptual errors, has receved comparatvely 
less attenton. No less mportant, perceptual errors occur 
when sensory nput s degraded, or “unusual,” as s often 
the case when flyng at nght, n the weather, or n other 
vsually mpovershed envronments. Faced wth actng 
on mperfect or ncomplete nformaton, arcrews run 
the rsk of msjudgng dstances, alttude, and decent 
rates, as well as respondng ncorrectly to a varety of 
vsual/vestbular llusons.
 A complete descrpton of the entre HFACS framework, ncludng 
all 4 ters and 9 causal categores, can be found n Wegmann and 
Shappell, 2003.
6Violations
Although there are many ways to dstngush among 
types of volatons, two dstnct types have been dent-
fied based on ther etology. Routine violations tend to be 
habtual by nature and are often enabled by a system of 
supervson and management that tolerates such depar-
tures from the rules (Reason, 990). Often referred to 
as “bendng the rules,” the classc example s that of the 
ndvdual who drves hs/her automoble consstently 5-
0 mph faster than allowed by law. Whle clearly aganst 
the law, the behavor s, n effect, sanctoned by local 
authortes (polce) who often wll not enforce the law 
untl speeds n excess of 0 mph over the posted lmt 
are observed.
Exceptional violations, on the other hand, are solated 
departures from authorty, nether typcal of the ndvdual 
nor condoned by management. For example, whle drvng 
65 n a 55 mph zone mght be condoned by authortes, 
drvng 05 mph n a 55 mph zone certanly would not. 
It s mportant to note that whle most exceptonal vola-
tons are appallng, they are not consdered “exceptonal” 
because of ther extreme nature. Rather, they are regarded 
as exceptonal because they are nether typcal of the 
ndvdual nor condoned by authorty.
human factors Intervention matrix (hfIX)
A prototype matrx, called the Human Factors Inter-
venton Matrx (HFIX), pts the unsafe acts ndvduals 
commt aganst the five dfferent nterventon approaches 
presented n Fgure 3. The utlty of such a framework 
seems ntutve. For example, f one were nterested n 
developng nterventons to address decson errors, the 
goal would be to dentfy prospectve nterventons wthn 
each approach (.e., organzatonal/admnstratve, hu-
man/crew, etc.), thereby ensurng that the wdest array 
of nterventons were consdered. By mappng prospec-
tve nterventons onto the matrx, t would be readly 
apparent f the scope of a proposed program was un- or 
mult-dmensonal. 
Alternatvely, a framework lke HFIX could be used 
proactvely to determne whch areas an organzaton has 
“covered” and where gaps exst n the current safety pro-
gram gven current trends n the error data. For nstance, 
f you knew that the largest threat to safety wthn your 
organzaton was skll-based errors, followed by decson 
errors, volatons, and perceptual errors (as s the case 
wth general and commercal avaton n the U.S.), HFIX 
could be used to determne f your proposed and future 
nterventons have the potental to address those needs 
and whch areas are currently beng targeted.
Hence, the purpose of Study 2 was to determne f 
such an approach could be used wthn the FAA and 
whch types of human error mght be affected by current 
and future nterventons. In a sense, ths analyss would 
provde a “benchmark” of current FAA nterventon ef-
forts. When combned wth exstng HFACS data (e.g., 
Shappell et al., n press; Detwler et al., 2006; Wegmann 
et al., 2005) possble gaps, f any, may be dentfied. 
fAA Safer Skies Initiative
As part of the FAA’s Safer Skies ntatve, three teams 
of experts from government, employee advocacy groups 
(e.g., the Natonal Ar Traffic Controllers Assocaton), 
the avaton ndustry, and academa were formed to ad-
dress cvlan avaton accdents. Two of those teams, the 
Commercal Avaton Safety Team (CAST) and General 
Avaton Jont Steerng Commttee (GA JSC), were formed 
to address specfic threats to commercal and general 
avaton, respectvely.
Wth the CAST and the GA JSC provdng oversght, 
three workng groups were formed: ) Jont Safety Analyss 
Teams (JSATs), 2) Jont Safety Implementaton Teams 
(JSITs), and 3) Jont Implementaton Montorng Teams 
(JIMTs). Partcularly germane to ths study were outcomes 
derved from the JSAT and JSIT workng groups snce 
they represented current and future nterventons neces-
sary to address human error assocated wth commercal 
and general avaton accdents. In partcular, ths study 
was nterested n the recommendatons from JSAT/JSIT 
teams examnng accdents assocated wth:
•	 Controlled flght nto terran
•	 Approach and landng
•	 Loss of control
•	 Runway ncursons
•	 Weather
•	 Plot decson-makng
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Figure 3. The “Human Factors Intervention  
matriX” (HFIX). 
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JSAT and JSIT Recommendations
JSAT and JSIT reports were collected from each 
CAST and GA JSC commttee by researchers at the 
Cvl Aerospace Medcal Insttute. After elmnatng 
duplcate recommendatons, a comprehensve lst was 
compled electroncally for classficaton. The final lst 
of 64 unque recommendatons was then randomzed 
to reduce bas.
Categorization of the Data
Eghteen Master of Aeronautcal Scence canddates 
were recruted from Embry-Rddle Aeronautcal Unver-
sty for Study 2. Each had experence n the avaton com-
munty as ether a plot, mantaner, or at an admnstratve 
level, and all had successfully completed a mnmum of 
one graduate-level human factors course.
After a roughly 4-hour tranng sesson on the HFACS 
and HFIX frameworks, subjects were randomly assgned 
to one of sx groups. Each 3-person team was then ran-
domly assgned roughly one-sxth of the recommenda-
tons to classfy.
Each team member was nstructed to ndependently 
classfy each recommendaton nto only one of the five 
nterventon approaches (.e., organzatonal/ admns-
tratve, human/crew, mechancal/engneerng, task/ms-
son, or physcal envronment). In addton, they were 
nstructed to dentfy any HFACS Unsafe Acts categores 
they felt the nterventon would mpact.
After the ntal ratng, team members were permt-
ted to dscuss ther classficaton wthn ther group to 
resolve any dfferences. A final, consensus classficaton 
for each recommendaton was then provded for further 
analyss. 
RESUlTS
The results of both classficaton tasks are presented 
n Fgure 4. Several observatons can be made from the 
data. Frst, as wth the NTSB recommendatons, a large 
percentage (36.6%) of the JSAT/JSIT recommendatons 
were drected at organzatonal/admnstratve levels. Lke-
wse, several (22.2%) of the recommendatons nvolved 
technologcal/engneerng approaches. However, unlke 
the NTSB where relatvely few recommendatons targeted 
the human, nearly one-thrd of those obtaned from the 
JSAT/JSITs dd so. Ths may be because, unlke the NTSB 
recommendatons, we selectvely chose those JSAT/JSIT 
reports that addressed human error ssues lke plot dec-
son-makng and runway ncursons. In that sense, the 
JSAT/JSIT data were much more homogenous (.e., they 
dd not contan non-human related accdents) and the pro-
posed nterventons may smply reflect that nherent bas. 
However, f that were true, one mght actually expect that 
an even larger percentage of the recommendatons would 
target the human/crew than was actually observed.
When examnng the HFACS classficatons, remember 
that, unlke the specfic approaches to accdent nterven-
tons where subjects were nstructed to select only one 
approach, they were permtted to select all of the HFACS 
Unsafe Act categores that they felt would be mpacted by 
a gven recommendaton. Therefore, unlke the nterven-
ton approaches whose percentages added up to 00%, 
the total percentages assocated wth each Unsafe Act 
category dd not.
Perhaps not unexpected, nterventons amed at dec-
son errors were assocated wth nearly three out of every 
four JSAT/JSIT recommendatons examned. In contrast, 
skll-based errors were assocated wth roughly 50% of 
the recommendatons followed by perceptual errors 
(37.6%) and volatons (26.9%). Of note, these numbers 
are slghtly dfferent than the percentage of accdents as-
socated wth each type of error where skll-based errors 
account for between 45-80% of the accdents, dependng 
on whether one s talkng about commercal or general 
avaton, respectvely (see Fgure ). Lkewse, roughly /3 
of the accdents were assocated wth decson errors, yet 
72.6% of the nterventons have some component that 
wll potentally affect plot decson-makng. 
Ths s not to say that there should be a one-to-one 
relatonshp between the percentage of accdents as-
socated wth a gven error category and the percentage 
of recommendatons amed at addressng these errors. 
After all, t may take more effort to address one error 
form than another, or more nterventons may naturally 
address plot decson-makng. In ether case, the global 
analyss presented here suggests that addtonal revew of 
ths apparent ncongruty s necessary.
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Figure 4. Percentage of JSAT/JSIT recom-
mendations classified by intervention approach 
and specific HFACS Unsafe Act addressed. 
8Perhaps more mportant, however, was the mappng of 
each nterventon wthn both the nterventon approach 
and the HFACS Unsafe Acts category (Fgure 4). As can 
be seen (whte boxes), three of the 20 possble boxes (orga-
nzatonal/ admnstratve by decson error, human/crew 
by decson error, and human/crew by skll-based error) 
contaned 20% or more of the JSAT/JSIT nterventons. 
On the surface, ths appears to reflect a narrow rather 
that a broad approach to accdent nterventon/mtga-
ton by these commttees. It s not that the nterventons 
contaned wthn these categores wll not be effectve, 
just that other, potentally equally vable, nterventons 
may have been overlooked.
It s nterestng to note, however, that f one examnes 
those boxes that contaned between 0-20% of the possble 
nterventons, nearly all of the remanng boxes among 
the organzatonal/ admnstratve, human/crew, and 
technology/ engneerng approaches are ncluded. What 
was not accounted for were human/crew and technol-
ogy/engneerng approaches dealng wth volatons of the 
rules and regulatons. Obvously, these approaches mght 
prove benefical f an organzaton wanted to modfy or 
curtal a partcular unsafe pattern of behavor (e.g., flght 
nto nstrument condtons whle on a vsual flght rules 
flght plan) through tranng or technologcal means.
More notable was the general lack of nterventons 
targetng the specfic task/msson of the arcrews or the 
envronment they are faced wth. Perhaps a closer examna-
ton of the operatons these arcrews are engaged n or the 
envronments they are expected to operate n s warranted. 
In any event, there may have been optons along these lnes 
that were not consdered by these select commttees.
SUmmARY
Ideally, tools such as HFIX provde a Gestalt of the 
safety program as a whole rather than an tem-by-tem 
accountng of each nterventon n an organzaton. After 
all, t s hard to know f peces are mssng n a puzzle untl 
you put them together. HFIX allows admnstrators and 
safety managers to put the nterventon peces together 
n such a way that they can get a “quck look” at the 
strengths and weaknesses of ther programs. Addtonally, 
t provdes decson makers wthn an organzaton the 
ablty to ensure that a broad spectrum of nterventons 
has been consdered. After all, only the most elementary 
of puzzles s comprsed of just a few peces; obvously, 
somethng as complex as human error n avaton wll 
consst of a number of peces. 
That beng sad, the results from Study 2 usng 
JSAT/JSIT nterventons, although clearly more mult-
dmensonal than NASA’s safety programs, stll dd not 
appear to fully address the current accdent trends n 
commercal and general avaton. At least on the surface, 
t appears that there are gaps n the safety program that 
should be addressed. 
For example, there was an apparent bas toward nter-
ventons amed at plot decson-makng, partcularly those 
utlzng organzatonal and human approaches. Whle ths 
s not nherently bad, prevous HFACS analyses suggest 
that addtonal effort should be placed on skll-based errors 
and volatons, two areas that appear underrepresented, 
gven current trends n the accdent data. 
Also noteworthy, few nterventons attempted to 
modfy/change the task tself or the envronment. A 
closer examnaton of the actual types of errors may 
suggest changes n routes people fly or the actual type of 
flghts beng flown. 
However, whle HFIX may prove useful when generat-
ng comprehensve nterventon strateges, organzatons 
smply cannot mplement every recommendaton. Other 
factors may need to be consdered before employng 
a gven nterventon. Factors such as effectiveness (.e., 
what s the lkelhood that t wll work?), cost (.e., can 
the organzaton afford the nterventon?), feasibility 
(.e., how easy wll the nterventon be to mplement 
or does t actually exst?), and acceptability (.e., wll the 
workforce accept the proposed nterventon?) all must 
be consdered.
As such, HFIX may actually be HFIX3 mappng human 
error aganst the nterventon approaches and evaluatons 
crtera (Fgure 5). Although t may appear complex, n 
realty organzatonal decson makers utlze ths thrd 
dmenson all the tme. To apply t to the two-dmen-
sonal HFIX framework s really not that great a leap. 
However, even wthout ths thrd dmenson, the mappng 
of specfic nterventons onto a matrx that combnes the 
five nterventon approaches wth general categores of 
human error can provde a broader perspectve of the 
FAA’s safety programs.
Feasibility
Cost
Effectiveness
Organizational/ 
Administrative
Human/ 
Crew
Technology/ 
Engineering
Decision
Errors
Skill-based
Errors
Perceptual
Errors
Task/ 
Mission
Violations
Operational/
Physical 
Environment
Acceptability
Figure 5. The HFIX3 framework. 
9GENERAl DISCUSSION
Hstorcally, most safety professonals have been 
heavly acculturated by ther own academc dscplnes. 
Whle such ndoctrnaton and tranng can facltate the 
development of hghly specalzed nterventons, t can 
also lead to “mtgaton myopa,” n whch provncal 
preventon measures preval.  Ths s not to say that such 
dogmatsm s ntentonal. Rather, these bases or “cogntve 
constrants” placed on our creatvty are qute smply the 
natural byproducts of the acculturaton process assoc-
ated wth each academc dscplne or socety n whch 
one lves. It should come as no surprse then that, whle 
engneers have tradtonally blamed the operator for er-
rors and behavorsts have wanted to fault system desgn 
for nducng errors, the fixes have been predctable. That 
s, engneers tend to recommend engneerng solutons, 
and psychologsts tend to recommend behavoral/hu-
man-centered fixes. In a broader sense, even socetes 
that emphasze ndvdual responsblty for one’s own 
actons tend to emphasze puntve fixes.  
In essence, safety recommendatons are not smply 
based on emprcal findngs surroundng an accdent. 
Rather, they are based on one’s phlosophcal vew of 
what actually consttutes a “cause” of an event, coupled 
wth one’s own based vew of how changes n human or 
system behavor can even be accomplshed. Therefore, 
thnkng “outsde the box” when t comes to generatng 
nterventon strateges s extremely dfficult to do; yet 
falure to do so can leave other potentally vable and 
effectve alternatves unexplored.
What shall we say then, that we are forever helpless 
vctms of our own acculturaton and tranng?  Absolutely 
not!  Just lke other cogntve bases (e.g., confirmaton 
bas and hndsght bas), we must first acknowledge and 
recognze the potental mpact that our own “mtga-
ton bas” has on constranng our judgment and then 
generate tools and technques for crcumventng these 
constrants.  
In the end, perhaps Reason (2005) put t best when 
he sad, “[Human errors] are lke mosqutoes. They can 
be swatted one by one, but they stll keep comng. The 
best remedes are to create more effectve defenses and 
to dran the swamps n whch they breed.” Where the 
HFACS framework provdes a vew of the swamp, HFIX 
makes certan that we are dranng the rght swamp n 
the most efficent and thorough manner.
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